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2I. INTRODUCTION
On September 12, 2001, the world woke up a different place.  In New York, the dust had 
not yet settled from the World Trade Center Towers, the fires still burned within the massive 
mountain of twisted steel, as the world watched the horrific events unfold again and again on 
news stations around the world.  The United States had been the victim of international 
terrorism.  Not since a Sunday in December 1941, had the United States been attacked through 
the air on its own soil by foreign enemies.  On September 11, 2001, nineteen men, by the order 
of Osama bin Laden, leader of the Al Qaeda terrorist organization, hijacked four U.S. 
commercial airliners bound for Los Angeles and used the planes as missiles.  Within minutes, 
two planes hit the north and south towers at the World Trade Center complex just as people were 
getting to work.  Moments later a plane slammed into the Pentagon in northern Virginia.  A 
plane hijacked over Cleveland turned and headed towards Washington D.C., but the heroic 
passengers commandeered the plane and it plummeted into a field in Pennsylvania.  By 
lunchtime Eastern Standard Time, 3,025 innocent people needlessly lost their lives.  After the 
horrific attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States’ “war on terrorism” had commenced.  
As the initial shock began to fade, bringing the persons responsible to justice became the focus 
of the United States as well as the feeling throughout the international community.  Osama bin
Laden and other high ranking Al Qaeda officials were blamed for planning, funding and 
executing the attacks on the United States.  
The United States and the rest of the world undoubtedly have an interest in administering 
justice to Osama bin Laden and other high-ranking Al Qaeda members for the attacks on the 
World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the flight that crashed in Pennsylvania in route to another 
target. George W. Bush stated in a speech to a joint session of Congress, “'[w]hether we bring 
3our enemies to justice or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done.”1  The United Nations 
also condemned the terrorist attacks and vowed its support in pursuing and punishing terrorists.2
Various forums have been suggested as appropriate to bring Osama bin Laden and other Al 
Qaeda terrorists to justice.  Some propose a trial in an international tribunal, such as the ones created by 
the United Nations for the atrocities committed in Rwanda3 and the former Yugoslavia, or even in the 
International Criminal Court in the initial stages of development.4  Others have suggested allowing the 
United States to try members of Al Qaeda in U.S. Federal District Courts; while President George W. 
Bush and his administration call for trial by a U.S. Military Tribunal.5  All proposed forums raise 
numerous issues and concerns.  With all the tribunals there are questions of whether jurisdiction is 
appropriate.  Trying terrorists responsible for the attacks in the United States District Courts or by U.S. 
military commissions raise concerns of whether extradition would be possible if the terrorists were 
apprehended in another country.
Where to try persons accused of international terrorism acts, more specifically, where to try 
Osama bin Laden or other Al Qaeda members when they are finally apprehended?  This note 
focuses on the requirements for jurisdiction of a few proposed forums, and the advantages and 
disadvantages of the proposed forums.  Part II defines and applies the five recognized general 
principles of international jurisdiction to the proposed forums.  Part III focuses on the 
jurisdiction of, advantages and disadvantages of United States Federal District Courts.  Part IV 
discuses the jurisdiction of, advantages and disadvantages of the proposed use of United States 
Military Commissions.  Part V of this note addresses the problems with extradition of captured 
terrorists.  Part VI focuses on proposed international tribunals including: the tribunal created by 
1 See George W. Bush, Speech on September 20, 2001 concerning the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
available at http://www.september11news.com/PresidentBushSpeech.htm. 
2 See G.A. Res 1368, U.N. SCOR, 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1368 (2001).  The United Nations Security 
Council on September 12, 2001 condemned the terrorist attacks on New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania as a 
“threat to international peace and security,” a violation of the U.N. Charter.  [hereinafter Resolution 1368].
3 See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., Annex, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
4
 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 
3217th mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
5
 Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non- Citizens in the War Against Terrorism § 
2(A)(1)(i)-(iii), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834 (2001) [hereinafter Military Order].
4the United Nations for the atrocities committed in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and the 
International Criminal Court in its initial stage of development.  Part VII concludes by finding 
the appropriate forum to administer justice to Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda terrorists for 
the atrocities of September 11, is to try the captured in the countries in which they are 
apprehended.  
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION
A. General Principles of International Law: Defined
International law recognizes five principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction: Territorial, 
National, Protective, Universal, and Passive Personal.6  Territorial principle is satisfied when the 
crime takes place on a state’s soil.7  If a national of a state commits an act, then that state has 
proper extraterritorial jurisdiction.8  The protective principle is based on the injury to a national 
interest.9  For crimes that are so atrocious, any territory that has custody of the offender can 
exercise jurisdiction for that act; this is the universal principle.10  The passive personal principle 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction is based on the nationality of the victim.11  The basis surrounding 
these five principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction is the notion of state sovereignty.12  The 
ability of a state to control conduct occurring within its territory, to protect its interests, and 
control its nationals and attach consequences to certain acts all relate to sovereignty.13
6 See Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 
F.2d 1200, 1205 (9th Cir. 1991).  See also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations §§ 402, 404 (1987); Harvard 
Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J. Int'l L. 435 (Supp. 1935)  
7
 Id.  See also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 402(1)(a) (“conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, 
takes place within its territory;” a state has jurisdiction over the offense).
8
 Id.
9
 Id.  See also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 402(1)(c) (1987) (“conduct outside its territory that has or 
is intended to have substantial effect within its territory”).
10
 Id.  See also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 404 (“A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe 
punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, 
slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism, even 
where none of the bases of jurisdiction indicated in § 402 is present”).
11
 Id.
12 See Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, supra note 6.
13
 Id.
5B. Application of General Principles
When the acts of Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda members involved in the 
September 11 attacks are applied to these principles, international jurisdiction appears to be 
satisfied.  The attacks took place in the territory of the United States; thus, the universally 
accepted principle of territorial principle is satisfied and the U.S. courts would have valid 
jurisdiction based on this principle.  The national principle when applied would concede 
recognized jurisdiction to where the offender is a national.  In the case of bin Laden, he was 
originally a national of Saudi Arabia, however, his citizenship has been revoked and he was 
exiled.14  Thus, it does not appear that bin Laden is a national of any country, however a case 
could be made for Saudi Arabia having jurisdiction based on the national principle.  The attacks 
on September 11 undoubtedly injured the United States interest, home and abroad; thus, U.S. 
jurisdiction would most likely be satisfied by the protective principle.  However, ninety-one 
different countries had nationals who died on September 11.15  As to each country that had 
nationals perish in the attacks, the degree of interests injured would have to be measured to 
determine proper jurisdiction under the protective principle.  If the interests injured were severe, 
jurisdiction may be proper in any of the ninety-one countries. 
The universal principle poses interesting quandaries.  It is safe to say that the multiple 
hijackings of U.S. commercial airliners and using them as missiles, killing more than 3,000 
persons in a matter of minutes would be considered an atrocious crime.  Many past international 
agreements have failed to suppress terrorism because of the inability to define precisely what is 
14See A Private Terrorist, Osama Bin Laden: Folk Hero, Pariah, Terrorist Kingpin, available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/binladen_profile.html (Bin Laden was exiled from Saudi Arabia 
in 1994 for his activated towards the royal family as well as alleged terrorists activities, he traveled to Sudan and 
disappeared).  
15 See Bush, supra note 1.  President Bush stated that we [United States] would not forget the citizens of eighty 
different nations who died with our own.  See also Porter Anderson, The ‘Great Struggle’: Consoling the Living, 
available at http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/09/11/ar911.memorial.main/index.html.
6covered.16  Recent efforts in international law by treaties, conventions, or resolutions have 
increased the acceptance of what crimes will be included in this principle.17  Crimes such as 
piracy, genocide, war crimes, hostage taking18, and hijacking aircrafts19 are considered 
universally atrocious where there is a common international goal to suppress such acts.  Most of 
the conventions and agreements require that a state make specific terrorist acts punishable by 
domestic laws and that an offender found in that state’s territory would either be tried under its 
laws or extradited to a country that has jurisdiction.20
The universal principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction would give rise to jurisdiction in 
many different countries.  The countries that are parties to the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (“Hijacking Convention”) (175 parties), and the International 
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (“Hostage Convention”) (112 parties) would have 
appropriate jurisdiction to try Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda terrorists involved in the 
attacks.21  Osama bin Laden allegedly planned, ordered, and executed the hijackings of 
September 11.  The plan involved the hijacking of multiple U.S. commercial aircrafts, a violation 
of the Hijacking Convention, which would also violate the Hostage Convention because the 
hijackers took hostages before the plan was fully executed.  Both of these conventions calls for 
the immediate punishment of the offenders in the country apprehended or extradition to a 
country that has appropriate jurisdiction.  Thus, under international law, the attacks would be 
16 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 404 cmt. a. (1987).
17
 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Concluded at Strasbourg, 27 January 1977.  Entered into 
force, 4 August 1978.  1137 U.N.T.S. 93. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Concluded at New York, 14 December 1973.  
Entered into force, 20 February 1977.  1035 U.N.T.S. 167; International Convention Against the Taking of 
Hostages, Conclude at New York, 17 December 1979.  Entered into force, 3 June 1983.  1316 U.N.T.S. 205 
[hereinafter Hostage Convention]; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Concluded 
at New York, 12 January 1998.  Entered into force, 23 May 2001.  Doc. A/RES/52/164;  International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of terrorism, Concluded at New York, 9 December 1999.  Entered into force, 
10 April 2002.  Resolution A/RES/54/109; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 
Concluded at Hague, 16 December 1970.  Entered into force 14 October 1971. 860 UNTS 105 [hereinafter 
Hijacking Convention].
18 See Hostage Convention, supra note 17, Article 1.
19 Id.
20 See Conventions, supra note 17.
21 Id. 
7considered a universal crime and therefore, any country that apprehends Osama bin Laden and 
other Al Qaeda terrorists involved in the September 11 attacks could try them under the universal 
principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  
The final extraterritorial principle recognized in international law is the passive principle.  
The United States could base jurisdiction on this principle because most of who died on 
September 11 were nationals of the U.S.  However, 91 other countries lost nationals to the 
attacks; each of which would, arguably, have jurisdiction based on the protective principle.  The 
protective principle is not universally recognized in international law.  The Restatement (Third) 
of Foreign Relations states: “[t]he [protective] principle has not been generally accepted for 
ordinary torts or crimes, but it is increasingly accepted as applied to terrorist and other organized 
attacks on a state's nationals by reason of their nationality, or to assassination of a state's 
diplomatic representatives or other officials.”22 Hence, the protective principle of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction would be appropriate over Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda terrorists involved 
in the attacks.  
III. UNITED STATES FEDERAL DISTRCIT COURTS
A. JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
The United States District Courts (“U.S. courts”) would have internationally recognized 
jurisdiction under four of the five principles established in international law.  The attacks in New 
York, Washington, and Pennsylvania on September 11 all took place in the United States; thus, 
the territorial principle is sufficient to confer jurisdiction to the U.S. courts.  There is little doubt 
that the terrorist attacks on 9/11 caused severe injury to an interest of the United States.  The 
U.S. has an international right to protect its interests home and abroad.  Such an injury to a 
substantial U.S. interest a U.S. interest would confer jurisdiction under the protective principle.  
The United States also has an interest in protecting its Nationals.  Over 3000 U.S. Nationals died, 
22
 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 402 cmt. g.
8thus satisfying the passive principle.  Crimes of terrorism are considered universal crimes, for 
which any country has jurisdiction to prosecute the terrorist, including the United States.  Thus, 
the universal principle is satisfied.  The protective and universal principles are controversial and 
not recognized by everyone in the international community.
In United States v. Yunis, the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia 
Circuit was faced with the problem of whether the protective and universal principles were a 
proper excise of personal jurisdiction over a hijacker.23  In 1985, Yunis and four other men 
boarded Royal Jordanian Airlines Flight 402.24  Shortly before the take-off the men hijacked the 
plane.25  Among the passengers were two American citizens who were tied up with the rest of the 
people on board.26  After several attempts to fly to different locations, the plane ended up in 
Beirut.27  The hijackers released the passengers, held a press conference, blew up the plane and 
fled.28  The Federal Bureau of Investigation lured Yunis on a boat for an alleged drug deal, 
where he was detained as soon as the boat reached international waters.29  Yunis appealed his 
conviction claiming the district court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction.30
The court held the Hostage Taking Act31, which Yunis was convicted under, was not in 
conflict with international law.32  It noted that the U.S. Hostage Taking Act was enacted to 
execute the Convention Against Taking of Hostages33, under which a party state can exercise 
jurisdiction over persons who take nationals hostage “if that state considers it appropriate.”34
The court next discussed the five generally recognized principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
23
 United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d. 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
24 Id. at 1089.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 1090.
31 See U.S.C. § 1203.  Hostage Taking Act.
32 Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1090.
33 See Hostage Convention, supra note 17.
34 Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1090.
9and concluded that the protective and universal principles were satisfied.35  Further the court 
explained that the job of the judicial system is to abide by the Constitution, laws, and treaties of 
the United States, “not to conform the laws of the land to norms of customary international 
law.”36  The court stated in regards to the universal and protective principles, “Aircraft hijacking 
may well be one of the few crimes so clearly condemned under the law of nations that states may 
assert universal jurisdiction to bring offenders to justice, even when the state has no territorial 
connection to the hijacking and its citizens are not involved.”37 United States courts have 
allowed the extraterritorial use of penal laws based on any one of the five principles of 
extraterritoriality.38
The United States by statute has specially conferred jurisdiction to the U.S. courts for 
particular crimes.  For example, under the crime of Aircraft Piracy, 49 U.S.C § 4650239, the 
statute proclaims there is jurisdiction over the crime of aircraft piracy if40 “a national of the 
United States was aboard the aircraft41; an offender is a national of the United States42; or an 
offender is afterwards found in the United States.”43  By adding this section on jurisdiction 
Congress has instilled the protective, national, and territorial principles found under international 
law.  Even where the intent of Congress is vague, it does not negate jurisdiction.  “[U.S.] courts 
will not blind themselves to potential violations of international law where legislative intent is 
ambiguous.”44  Therefore, if the statute explicitly confers jurisdiction there is little problem, but 
even where it is not expressly stated, a U.S. court can find jurisdiction over certain offenses. 
35 Id. at 1091.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 1092.
38 Chua Han Mow, 730 F.2d at 1312.
39
 49 U.S.C. § 46502 (1996).
40
 49 U.S.C. § 46502 (b)(2).
41
 49 U.S.C. § 46502 (b)(2)(A).
42
 49 U.S.C. § 46502 (b)(2)(B).
43
 49 U.S.C. § 46502 (b)(2)(C).
44 See Yunis, 924 F.2d. at 1091.
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B. Offenses Available In United States District Courts
If Osama bin Laden or Al Qaeda members were tried in the U.S. courts, what offenses 
could be tried?  The United States could prosecute for international violations of the law of 
nations, more specifically war crimes, and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.45
The United States has enacted a wide array of federal antiterrorism acts.  For example, Zacarias 
Moussaoui,46 a French nationalist, has been charged in the Untied States District Court with acts 
connected with the September 11 terrorist attacks.  Specifically, Moussaoui was charged in 
United States District Court with Conspiracy to Commit Acts of Terrorism Transcending 
National Boundaries47; Conspiracy to Commit Aircraft Piracy48; Conspiracy to Destroy 
Aircraft49; Conspiracy to Use Weapons of Mass Destruction50; Conspiracy to Murder United 
States Employees51; and Conspiracy to Destroy Property.52  There is a considerable amount of 
antiterrorism legislation at the U.S. court’s disposal, with even more proposed in response to the 
attacks of September 11.  
C. Advantages: United States District Courts
There are several advantages to prosecuting Osama bin Laden in U.S. courts.  The United 
States has countless antiterrorism legislation at the prosecutor’s discretion; thus, finding crimes 
that would lead to justice being served would be easier found.  The international community 
would be more willing to accept a decision in the U.S. courts, as opposed to a secret military 
tribunal headed by the United States.  Countries may be more willing to extradite to U.S. civilian 
courts rather than a military commission.  In the U.S. courts, due process guarantees would be 
afforded to the suspects; even to the likes of bin Laden.  U.S. courts have broad powers to protect 
45 See 18 U.S.C. §2441 (2000); see, e.g., Regulations on the Law and Customs of War on Land, Art. 25, annex to 
Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631.
46
 Indictment of Zacaria Moussaoui, available at  http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/moussaouiindictment.htm. 
47
 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332b(a)(2) & (c).
48
 49 U.S.C. §§ 46502(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2)(B).
49
 18 U.S.C. §§ 32(a)(7) & 34.
50
 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a).
51
 18 U.S.C. §§ 1114 & 1117.
52
 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(f), (i), (n).
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information, witnesses, informants, judges, jurors, and those involved in the judicial process.53
“[T]he use of prosecutorial techniques developed in fighting organized crime has taught 
prosecutors that they can get testimony in return for deals with low ranking members of a 
conspiracy, and that putting defendants on trial together gives a great ability to show jurors the 
full extent of the criminal organization.”54
D. Disadvantages: United States District Courts
Prosecuting Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda terrorists in U.S. courts has various 
disadvantages.  Unlike the military commissions, there are strict rules of evidence which act to 
limit what can be presented in U.S. courts.  The court proceedings would be conducted in an 
open forum and the record would be public.  This is especially a concern of the intelligence 
agencies because there is classified information that may be beneficial to Al Qaeda that would be 
easily accessible.  However, there is the 1980 Classified Information Procedures Act that 
provides rules on sensitive information at trial, but the proceedings are nonetheless public.55
Besides classified information, there is other useful information that may come to fruition by 
trial in an open forum.    For example, “[p]ublications, as took place in the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing, of existence engineering data on the construction of the towers; such 
information is public but not easy to obtain, unless, for example, it is brought into open court in a 
trial.”56  There are concerns among the international community as to whether any terrorist 
linked to the horrific acts of 9/11 could obtain a fair and impartial trial.  It would be hard to 
imagine finding a person to sit on a jury whose life was not affected in some way by the attacks.  
53
 Kenneth Anderson, What to do with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda Terrorists?  A Qualified Defense of Military 
Commissions and United States Policy on Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 
591, 607 (2002).
54 Id.
55 See Anderson, supra note 53, at 609.
56 Id.  
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IV. UNITED STATES MILITARY COMMISSIONS
A. Jurisdiction of United States Military Commissions
President George W. Bush and his administration have been adamant on prosecuting 
apprehended terrorists in a military tribunal.  On November 13, 2001, President Bush, as 
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States issued Military Order 57833 
titled Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism 
(“Military Order”).57  The Military Order proclaims in order “[t]o protect the United States and 
its citizens, and for the effective conduct of military operations and prevention of terrorist 
attacks, it is necessary for individuals subject to this order … be detained, and, when tried, to be 
tried for violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws by military tribunals.”58
Individuals subject to this order are non-U.S. citizens who are or were a member of Al Qaeda59, 
or has “engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism60…” 
and finally, anyone who provides safe haven to either of the former.61  On March 22, 2002, the 
Defense Department issued its Military Commissions Order No.1, Procedures For Trials by 
Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism 
(“Order 1”), which clarifies the President’s Military Order.  Order 1 expounds on President 
Bush’s Military Order by stating the rules of evidence, the defendants choice of counsel, 
defendant’s right to have a public proceeding, unless the presiding officer deems it at odds with 
the Military Order, and the minimal due process guarantees.62
57 See Military Order, supra note 5.
58
 Military Order(e), supra note 5.
59
 Military Order(2)(a)(1)(i), supra note 5.
60
 Military Order(2)(a)(1)(ii), supra note 5.
61
 Military Order(2)(a)(1)(iii), supra note 5.
62
 U.S. Dep't of Defense, Military Commissions Order No. 1, Procedures for Trials by Military Commissions of 
Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism (Mar. 21, 2002), available at http:// 
www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf
13
International law recognizes the use of military courts to adjudicate prisoners during 
armed conflict.63  Article 84 of the third Geneva Convention states that, "[a] prisoner of war shall 
be tried only by a military court, unless the existing laws of the Detaining Power expressly 
permit the civil courts to try a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power in respect of 
the particular offense."64  Court-martials are a permissible forum to prosecute prisoners of war 
under United Stated law as well; however, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UMCJ”)65
limits personal jurisdiction to U.S. military personnel66, prisoners of war67, and a restricted class 
of civilians.68  The legal basis for the creation of military commissions in the United States is 
vested in Congress’ constitutional power to define and punish offenses against the law of 
nations; Congress has conferred the creation of military tribunals to the executive branch.69
In Ex parte Quirin70, the United States Supreme Court was faced with the question of 
whether the creation of military commissions by executive order, was within the scope of the 
President’s power granted by statute or the Constitution of the United States, and whether the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments would allow trial by jury.  Ex parte Quirin was a case involving 
alleged German saboteurs who received training in Germany, under the cover of darkness, 
waded ashore in Florida from a German submarine back into the United States with the intent on 
destroying war industries and war installations.71  All the men involved were taken into custody 
in New York and Chicago.72  Pursuant to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Military Order 5103, 
63
 Michael J. Matheson, U.S. Military Commissions: One of Several Options, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 354 (2002).
64
 Convention (No. IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War.  Concluded at Geneva, 12 
August 1949.  Entered into force, 21 October 1950.  75 U.N.T.S. 287.
65
 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-948 (2000), the Uniform Code of Military Justice can be found in the Manual for Courts-Martial 
United States (2000), available at http:\\www.jag.navy.mil/documents/mcm2000.pdf.  
66 See 10 U.S.C. § 801(2)(1).
67 See 10 U.S.C. § 801(2)(9).
68 See 10 U.S.C.§ 801(2)(10)-(11); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 (2000).  See also Daryl A. Mundis, The Use of Military 
Commissions to Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 320, 321 (2002).
69
 Mundis, supra note 68, at 321. 
70
 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) [hereinafter Quirin].
71 Id. at 8-9.
72 Id.
14
July 2, 194273, all saboteurs were prosecuted in a military tribunal for violations of the laws of 
war74, Article 81, 82 of the Articles of war, and conspiracy to commit the alleged offenses.75
The Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]he Constitution thus invests the President as 
Commander in Chief with the power to wage war which Congress has declared, and to carry into 
effect all laws passed by Congress for the conduct of war and for the government and regulation 
of the Armed Forces, and all laws defining and punishing [offenses] against the law of nations, 
including those which pertain to the conduct of war.”76  Congress has provided the rules and 
regulations of the Armed Forces under the Articles of War.77  “Congress has explicitly 
provided…that military tribunals shall have appropriate jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses 
against the laws of war...”78  When [President Roosevelt] issued the Executive Order proclaiming 
the use of military tribunals, the President was exercising the power conferred to him by 
Congress.79  The court held that the President is authorized to order combatants tried in a military 
commission for violation of the law of war, and such an order is lawful exercise of his powers.80
The Supreme Court was left to determine whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments applied to 
prosecutions in a military tribunal.  “[T]he Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not restrict whatever 
authority was conferred by the Constitution to try offenses against the law of war by military 
commission, and that petitioners charged with such an offense not required to be tried by jury at 
common law, were lawfully placed on trial by Commission without a jury.”81  Consequently, 
those tried in military tribunals for violations of the law of war do not have the right to request a 
jury by its peers.  
73
 President’s Proclamation No. 2561.
74
 Law of war is embodied in the law of nations.  The law of nations is based on natural law and proscribes how 
nations are to act towards other nations, available at http://www.pixi.com/~kingdom/lawintro.html. 
75
 Quirin supra note 70, at 8.
76 Id. at 10.
77 Id. See also 10 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1593 (2000).
78 Id.
79
 Quirin supra note 70, at 11.
80 Id. at 20.
81 Id. at 19.
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The Military Order issued by President Bush is similar to the order given by Franklin D. 
Roosevelt (“FDR”), which was at controversy in Ex parte Quirin.82  The Supreme Court upheld 
FDR’s order as a constitutionally valid exercise of the President’s power.  If President Bush’s 
Military Order were challenged, the same arguments would be trotted out in front of the Supreme 
Court.  However, Bush’s Military Order is distinguishable from Roosevelt’s order.  When 
President Roosevelt issued his Military Order, the United States was entrenched in the Second 
World War.  When the attacks of September 11 occurred, the U.S. was not at war.  However, it 
can be argued that the United States is now entrenched in a “war on terrorism,” and the Military 
Order is necessary to effectuate the goal suppressing international terrorism.  Even though it is 
distinguishable, it appears that the Supreme Court would uphold President Bush’s Military Order 
for the same reasons the court upheld FDR’s order in Ex parte Quirin.  “Military commissions 
are thus an accepted means of trying persons who commit offenses against the laws of war, such 
as the deliberate targeting of civilians, abuse of prisoners, and failure of combatants to 
distinguish themselves from the civilian population.”83
B. Advantages: United States Military Commissions
There are many advantages to allowing Osama bin Laden and other members of the Al 
Qaeda organization to be prosecuted in a U.S. military commission under President Bush’s 
Military Order.  The United States was the country most affected by the acts of terrorism; hence 
it should have the right to administer justice to bin Laden.  The military tribunals would not be 
held in a public forum; consequently sensitive U.S. intelligence information gathered for the 
fight against terrorism would not be exposed to the general public.  The military commissions 
would be a quick and efficient mechanism of justice because there is no jury and the process is 
streamlined.  The Military Order provides that the admission of evidence is at the discretion of 
82 See Quirin supra note 70. 
83
 Michael J. Matheson, supra note 63, at 356. 
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the presiding officer of the military commission.84  Rules on hearsay would not be as stringent as 
in the domestic courts of the United States, which would allow more evidence to be presented 
and greater discretion to the judge in determining what will be entered as evidence.  For 
example, an alleged telephone call from Osama bin Laden to his mother stating that “something 
big was imminent” shortly before the attacks on September 11 could be deemed admissible 
under the military tribunals’ informal rules of evidence.85  The Military Order provides that 
punishment will be administered in accordance with the law, including “life imprisonment and 
death,” thus the punishment will be harsh.86
C. Disadvantages: United States Military Commissions
The first disadvantage to the use of United States military commissions is a state that 
apprehends an Al Qaeda member may block extradition to the U.S. because of President Bush’s 
Military Order.  In November 2001, Spain officials arrested eight men allegedly belonging to the 
Al Qaeda network.87  It has been reported that Spain may deny any extradition request based on 
the condition of the death row prisons in the United States.88  Spain asserts that the “Bush 
administration’s plan to try suspected foreign terrorists in military courts, which would arguably 
violate the guarantee of an ‘independent and impartial tribunal’ as provided for in Article 6 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(“European Convention on Human Rights”).”89  Consequently, extradition from a state party to 
the European Convention may block extradition to the United States based on the nature of the 
military commissions alone, let alone any objections to capital punishment.  President Bush in 
the Military Order did not exclude the use of capital punishment.  If the United States requests 
84 See Military Order(4)(c)(3), supra note 5.
85 See Anderson, supra note 53, at 609.
86 See Military Order(4)(a), supra note 5.
87 See Spain Shows Suspect Terrorist Haul, CNN.com (Nov. 14, 2001), available at http://www.cnn.com/2001/
WORLD/europe/11/14/inv.spain.videos/index.html. 
88
 Daniel J. Sharfstein, Human Rights Beyond the War on Terrorism: Extradition Defenses Bases on Prison 
Conditions in the United States, 42 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1137, 1138 (2002).  
89 Id. at 1138.
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extradition of an Al Qaeda terrorist, European countries may be reluctant to extradite to the U.S. 
because there is a chance the suspect would face the death penalty.  Consequenty, President 
Bush’s plan to try non U.S. Al Qaeda terrorists in a military commission without outlawing the 
death penalty as a possible punishment may prove to be an insurmountable hurdle to extradition.  
The next flaw in the use of U.S. military commissions is what is the status of the 
suspected terrorist.  Is a detainee considered a prisoner of war (“POW”) under the Third Geneva 
Convention (“Geneva Convention III”)?90  Article four of the Geneva Convention III defines in 
part the POW’s include persons “who have fallen into the hands of the enemy,” as:
Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of 
organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or 
outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or 
volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following 
conditions: (a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) 
that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that of carrying arms 
openly; (d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs 
of war.91
The terrorists who attacked the United States on September 11 do not meet the POW 
requirement under the Geneva Convention III because the terrorists failed to conduct “their 
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war92” when they used “civilians as both 
the means and targets of their attacks93….”  In addition, the terrorists did not carry arms openly 
and had no “fixed distinctive sign recogniz[able].”  The consequence is that POWs under the 
Geneva Convention III are entitled to due process protections.94  In essence, if a detainee 
qualifies as a POW under the Geneva Convention III, then the country prosecuting the POW 
would have to provide the same safeguards as if it was trying one of its own military personnel.95
The procedures to try U.S. military personnel are found under the Uniform Code of Military 
90
 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.  Concluded at Geneva, 12 August 1949.  
Entered into force, 21 October 1950.  75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention].
91 Id., Art. 4(A)(2)(a)-(d). See also Anderson, supra note 53, at 614-15.
92 Id., Art. 4(A)(2)(d).
93
 Anderson, supra note 53, at 616.
94 See Third Geneva Convention, supra  note 90, Arts. 99-108; see also Anderson, supra note 58.
95 See Anderson, supra note 53, at 616.
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Justice96, and afford virtually the same constitutional protections as the United States civilian 
courts.97  The purpose of President Bush’s Military Order would be negated if international 
terrorists were to gain all the due process protections granted by the United States Constitution.98
The international community may not believe that a trial in United States military 
commissions is an impartial forum; thus, the alleged terrorist would not receive a fair trial.  This 
is reiterated by the fact that the Military Order does not provide Fifth or Sixth Amendment 
protections.  The Constitutional rights guaranteed to the alleged suspects are a miniscule basket 
of rights.  The Military Order only guarantees “a full and fair trial, with which the military 
commission sitting as the triers of both fact and law.”99  A panel of three presiding officers will 
act as the judge, jury, and ultimately decide fate of the suspects.  By the United States creating 
secret military tribunals to try non-citizens, then that would create a precedent allowing other 
countries to create secret tribunals with limited due process guarantees.  Use of military tribunals 
to try suspects who most likely will be of the Muslim faith, would create a belief that the U.S. is 
on a “crusade to kill, massacre, and eradicate Muslims.”100  Finally, a decision rendered by a 
military commission created by the United States would not be given full credit under 
international law.  It is unlikely that the world would accept the punishment administered by the 
commissions.  
IV. Extradition: Hurdle Thwarting United States Pursuit for Justice
There is little doubt that the United States has jurisdiction in either domestic courts or in 
military commissions over Osama bin Laden and other high-ranking Al Qaeda terrorists for the 
acts of September 11.  However, a formidable challenge stands in the way of the U.S. exercising 
96
 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-948 (2000), the Uniform Code of Military Justice can be found in the Manual for Courts-Martial 
United States (2000), available at http:\\www.jag.navy.mil/documents/mcm2000.pdf.  
97 See Anderson, supra, note 53. at 616.
98 Id. at 617.
99 See Military Order (4)(c)(2), supra note 5.
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this power: extradition.  If any of the wanted terrorists were apprehended in countries other than 
the United States, then the U.S. would have to request extradition.  
“Extradition is the process by which persons charged with or convicted of a crime against 
the law of a state and found in a foreign state are returned by the latter to the former for trial or 
punishment.”101  Extradition is based on fundamental principles of state sovereignty, more 
specifically the notion that no state can violate another state’s territorial sovereignty to 
apprehend a criminal without consent.102  Requesting and granting extradition by a state is not a 
right, but is a discretionary power; in other words, a state is not under any legal obligation to 
extradite unless there is a treaty to the contrary.103  In the United States, granting or requesting 
extradition will only be done pursuant to a treaty.104  Treaties between two or more states today 
govern most extraditions.  These treaties usually provide that each state agrees reciprocally to 
surrender offenders found in its territory to the state where the crime took place.105  Most 
extradition treaties specifically define the offenses that can be extradited, any exceptions, and the 
basic elements that must be met in order to extradite.106
Extradition treaties and state extradition laws usually require several elements that must 
be satisfied before an extradition will be deemed proper under international law.  First, the 
criminal act must be prohibited in both the requesting state and the state where the offender is 
present; this is the doctrine of double criminality.107  Second, the requesting state can only 
101See Marjorie M. Whiteman, 6 Digest of International Law 772-28 (1968); Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations IV, 7, B IN; See also, Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, (1902) (defining extradition as "the surrender by 
one nation to another of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside of its own territory, and within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try and to punish him, demands the surrender").
102 See John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 Geo L. J. 1441, 1454 (1988).
103
 Whiteman, supra note 101,at 772-28.
104See Bassiouni, supra note 104, at 347-61; See also, United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1986) 
(stating that extradition is based on principally on treaties and in absent of treaties, on international comity).
105 See Whiteman, supra note 101, at 772-28.
106For an example, See European Convention on Extradition.  Concluded at Paris, 13 December 1957.  Entered into 
force, 18 April 1960.  359 U.N.T.S. 274; Additional Protocal to the European Convention on Extradition.  
Concluded in Paris, 15 October 1975.  Entered into force 20 August 1979. E.T.S. No. 86; Second Additional 
Protocal to the European Convention on Extradition.  Conclude at Paris, 17 March 1978.  Entered into force, 5 June 
1983.  E.T.S. No. 98.  
107 See Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, supra note 6.
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prosecute for the crime or crimes for which the extradition is sought; this is the doctrine of 
specialty.108  Third, the requesting state must produce enough evidence to establish probable 
cause that the fugitive committed the crime.109  Finally, a state must prove that the offense does 
not fall into any exception for which a state can refuse extradition.
A. Treaties & Capital Punishment
The United States would have to overcome various obstacles in order to obtain 
extradition of Osama bin Laden or other Al Qaeda members.  Absent a treaty, a state is under no 
legal obligation to accommodate the United States by granting extradition.  The next roadblock 
is that the United States still has capital punishment.  Finally, a state granting asylum to wanted 
Al Qaeda members could claim that the offense is political in nature and therefore not 
extraditable.  
The United States has extradition treaties with roughly 106 countries.110  If Osama bin 
Laden were found in any country without an extradition treaty, extraditing him would be very 
difficult.  Any of those states granting asylum has the right to refuse the United States’ request 
for extradition.  However, such a denial would not be an intelligent decision given that the 
United States has made it clear that any state that provides asylum to any terrorist would suffer 
the consequences.  President George W. Bush stated, “[The United States] will pursue nations 
that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism, [e]very nation in every region now has a decision to 
make; either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.”111  The Taliban regime refused the 
United States’ demand to hand over bin Laden and other Al Qaeda members, for which the U.S. 
attacked Afghanistan toppling the Taliban government.  Thus, any state brazen enough to shelter 
Bin Laden or any other terrorist by the means of refusing extradition would suffer harsh 
108 Id. at 361.
109 See Whiteman, supra note 101.
110 See 18 U.S.C § 3181 (2000) (listing extradition treaties by countries, date signed, and date entered into force).
111 See Bush, supra note 1.  
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repercussions.  This is not to say that the United States are willing to attack any country that 
refuses to extradite, so long as the terrorists are brought to justice.  
Any terrorist extradited to the United States to stand trial for their offense would, with 
little doubt, face the death penalty.  In 1989, the European Court of Human Rights held in 
Soering v. United States112 that persons charged with capital offenses violated Article 3 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(“European Convention on Human Rights”).113  Article 3 states, “[n]o one shall be subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”  In Soering, the European Court on 
Human Rights found the lengthy stays and harsh death row conditions constituted “inhuman” 
treatment or punishment.114  The Soering case is one of many in a growing trend that signatories 
to the European Convention on Human Rights can refuse to extradite to the United States when 
terrorists are facing the death penalty because extradition would violate Article 3 of the 
Convention’s prevention of “inhuman” punishment and treatment.  
B. Political Offense Exception
The final obstacle the United States would have to hurdle is the political offense 
exception to extradition.  Most states can refuse to extradite for offenses that are political in 
nature.  Political offense has traditionally two meanings; first, there are “purely political” 
offenses that are crimes aimed directly at the state, consequently there is no common crime; 
second, there is a category of “relative political offense in which the political motivation behind 
an otherwise common crime renders the act ‘political’.”115  There is not a universal excepted 
definition as to what constitutes a political offense, however most courts agree when describing 
112 See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R (ser. A) (1989).
113
 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Concluded at Rome, 4 
November 1950.  Entered into force, 3 September 1953.  213 U.N.T.S 222.  [hereafter European Convention for 
Human Rights].  
114 See supra note 18; see also Sharfstein, supra note 88, at 1138.
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the elements.116  “The opinio juris conceives of ‘purely political’ offenses as acts against the 
security of the state.”117  The crimes that fall into this category lack the essential characteristics 
of the common crime, such as malice or personal gain.118  The intention of the person 
committing the offense is to cause change in the political system, thereby hurting the state’s 
political regime.119  However, no such agreement can be found in regards to “relative political” 
offenses.120  The degree of political motivation required making a crime a political offense and 
unextraditable depends on the application of the laws of the states.121  There are a number of 
negative definitions of political offense.122  Extradition treaties sometimes use negative 
definitions of political offense, in other words, the treaty will list specific crimes or offenses that 
will not be considered political, such as war crimes, genocide, or certain acts of terrorism.123
Extradition requests are subject to interpretation by the judicial branch before the 
executive branch renders the final decision.124  Four principles used for judicial interpretation 
have emerged to determine whether an offense is a political offense: The Political Incident 
Theory, The United States Approach, The Rights Injured Approach, and The Predominance 
Approach.125
The Anglo-Saxon Approach: The Political Incident Theory is used primarily by the 
British Courts to interpret what constitutes a political offense.126  This approach asserts that the 
act must be “incidental to and form…part of the political disturbance” and the crimes must be “in 
116 Id.  
117 Id.
118 Id. 
119 Id.
120
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furtherance” of the political disturbances.127  In Schtracks v. Government of Israel, the court held 
that “the political offense must be connected with an uprising, disturbance, insurrection, civil 
war, or struggle for power.”128  The theory is a subjective approach with little attention being 
paid to the actual act.129  The test as it stands today is that a state may refuse to extradite if the 
crime was incidental to and formed a part of a political disturbance.130
If Osama bin Laden or any Al Qaeda members were apprehended in a country that 
interpreted the political offense under the Political Incidence Theory, could that state refuse to 
extradite them to the United States?  The court would pay little attention to the actual crime or 
impact on the international community that is undoubtedly large.  Was there a political uprising 
by the group who the perpetrator belongs?  An argument could be made that Al Qaeda is in a war 
or struggle for power with the West as the political oppressor.  The reason for the political 
offense exception was the concerned with returning a political offender back to his or her 
political advisories.131  If this argument can be made successfully, then the first prong has been 
met.  The second prong would be satisfied if the act were part of a larger political struggle.  
Osama bin Laden’s terrorist activities have political undertones, but in his own words he called 
for a “jihad,” which by definition is a “holy war,” not a political uprising.  A court could find that 
Osama bin Laden is at war with the United States, which is requesting extradition, is the political 
adversary.  It appears a court using the Political Incidence Theory could find that these were a 
political offense and unextraditable.132
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The next interpretation of what constitutes a political offense is the United States 
Approach.  This model developed out of the Political Incidence Theory used by British Courts.133
“The two-part definition of the political offense, that the act must be committed in the course of, 
and incidental to the political offense, a violent political disturbance, such as war, revolution, or 
rebellion, has been mechanically applied.”134  The United States Courts have refused to inquire 
into the motives behind the state requesting extradition.135  A court could deny extradition of Bin 
Laden or Al Qaeda members because the acts could fit under this definition of political 
offense.136
The French Test: The Rights Injured Approach is an objective test and considers an act 
political only when the perpetrator’s acts “directly injure the rights of the state.”137  The act gains 
political offense status by an injury to the state’s rights, not from the motive of the offender.138
“By this formulation, the French courts severely restrict the scope of the political offense 
exception, limiting it to only ‘pure political’ acts and automatically excluding ‘relative political’ 
offense.”139  The focus then is on the injury to the United States and not the motive of Osama bin 
Laden or Al Qaeda members.  A “purely political” offense is an act directed at a state and there 
is no element of a common crime.140  The attacks of September 11 could be considered a “purely 
political” act.  There was no element of financial gain or motive of malice; the intent was to 
topple the United States as a political power.  Thus, the terrorists act could be considered 
political under the French Test: Rights Injured Approach and therefore unextraditable.  
must be granted.  This was a negative definition approach, i.e. listing explicitly what crimes would not be considered 
political.  
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The final theory in defining what constitutes a political offense is The Swiss Test: The 
Predominance approach.  The Swiss test includes the Political Incidence element of political 
disturbance, but adds two additional elements.141  The Swiss test has three general requirements: 
the act must be politically motivated; proportional to the political objective desired, and must be 
incidental in a struggle for political power.142  If Osama bin Laden or Al Qaeda members are 
seized in a country that interprets the political offense under the Swiss Test, the inquiry would 
start with the connection between the crime committed and the political purpose.143  The crimes 
were committed to achieve a political end, that is the fall of Western values; more specifically 
the fall of the United States.  Thus, the first element appears to be met.  The acts of September 11 
need to be proportional to the political goal desired.  bin Laden’s goal is to topple the U.S. 
government and any Western ideologies.  An argument can be made that his acts are proportional 
to achieving that end; hence, the second prong could be satisfied.  It could be argued that the act 
was committed in a struggle for political power.  The struggle for political power is with the 
United States and its involvement in the middle east where bin Laden has stated that the U.S. 
should pull out of the region altogether.  If the United States requested extradition from a state 
that applies the Swiss Test it appears that the state could refuse to extradite claiming that the 
September 11 attacks on the U.S. were political in nature and unextraditable.  However, “it is 
unlikely in a situation other than one involving an escape from a totalitarian regime, that status of 
a political crime would be attributed to terrorists acts under the Swiss test.”144
If a rigid application of the four theories on determining the definition of political 
offense, then a state could refuse the United States request for extradition under any of the four 
theories.  However, most countries by convention or treaty have limited the political offense 
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exception to extradition not to include certain acts of terrorism.145  While recent conventions on 
terrorism require a party to extradite or punish the terrorist under its own laws.  Justice will be 
served, nevertheless the United States may have harsher laws than the state that refuses to 
extradite and try them under its own laws pursuant to its right under the conventions.  With more 
than 3,000 lives lost and an estimated $36 Billion dollars146 in damages to New York alone, it 
would be hard to imagine a state refusing extradition under the political offense exception.  
VI. INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
Starting in August of 1945, with the creation of the Nuremberg tribunal147 to prosecute 
members of the Nazi party for war crimes committed during the Second World War, ad hoc 
international tribunals were born.  The second tribunal was formed in 1946 to prosecute Japanese 
war criminals for their atrocities.148  After the creation of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the United 
Nations and the rest of the international community started inquiring about creating a permanent 
international criminal court to prosecute grave breaches of the United Nations Charter.149  In 
1948, the United Nations General Assembly passed resolution 260, discussing the prevention and 
punishment of the crime of genocide.150  In the same resolution, a law commission was created 
145
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inquiring into an international criminal court.151  It would be over fifty years before a U.N. 
created international criminal tribunal would reappear.152  The United Nations in 1993, adopted 
resolution 827 creating the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) to 
prosecute crimes committed during the civil war of that country.153  In 1994, the United Nations 
passed another resolution, 955, to create the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(“ICTR”) to prosecute war crimes in Rwanda.154  Finally, in 1998, the Rome Statute was set for 
signatures, which would create a permanent International Criminal Court.155
The United Nations has the power to extend jurisdiction of either the ICTY or the ICTR 
to include offenders of 9/11 and international terrorists.  The recently created ICC’s subject 
matter jurisdiction could be extended to hear cases of international terrorism.  The United 
Nations pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter156 has the power to create an ad hoc tribunal 
to try alleged terrorists.  Thus, the question that is presented is whether any of the international 
tribunals would be an appropriate place to prosecute Osama bin Laden or other Al Qaeda 
members who are apprehended.  
A. Jurisdiction of an International Tribunal
Jurisdiction of an international tribunal under the general principles of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction would be satisfied pursuant to three of the five principles.  The United Nations, when 
it created the ICTY and the ICTR, limited the courts jurisdiction to crimes committed in the 
respective countries.  The international tribunals would have jurisdiction based on the territorial 
principle because the courts specifically have power to adjudicate crimes committed in the 
151 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – Overview, supra note 149.
152 Id.
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former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  The protective principle can be satisfied based not on an injury 
to a state’s interests, but rather an injury to the world as a whole.  In other words, the United 
Nations’ purposes are “the maintenance of international peace and security,” thus it is a 
international interests being protecting by conferring jurisdiction to an international tribunal.157
The U.N. instructs the ad hoc tribunals to hear only the most serious crimes; for example, the 
ICTY was created to combat genocide, grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
violations of the laws of war, and crimes against humanity.158  These crimes are all serious 
violations of international law, and are accepted as universal crimes punishable by any state that 
apprehends an offender.  Hence, the international ad hoc tribunals satisfy the universal principle 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  
B. The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
The ICTY was created by the United Nations to combat atrocities committed during the 
civil war in Yugoslavia.159  It is located at Hague in the Netherlands.160  Its purpose is to 
prosecute persons for humanitarian rights violations during the war, deter further crimes in the 
unstable country, and continue the restoration of peace to the former Yugoslavia.161  The tribunal 
has subject matter jurisdiction over grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions162, 
violations of the laws or customs of war163, genocide164, and crimes against humanity.165
Jurisdiction is limited by geography as well as time.166  The jurisdiction is only over crimes 
committed in Yugoslavia since 1991.167  Personal jurisdiction is over persons only, and not 
157 See U.N. Charter, supra note 156.
158 See ICTY Statute, supra note 148.
159 See ICTY Statute, supra note 148.
160 See The ICTY at a Glance, available at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm.
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organizations, political parties, or corporations.168  The ICTY has concurrent jurisdiction with 
national courts; however, the ICTY can claim primacy over the national courts.169
As the ICTY stands today, it does not have subject matter or personal jurisdiction over 
Osama bin Laden or any other Al Qaeda member unless they commit a crime in the former 
Yugoslavia.  The ICTY has limited jurisdiction over crimes committed since 1991, but only 
crimes that are committed in Yugoslavia.  The United Nations could extend by resolution the 
jurisdiction of the ICTY to hear cases concerning crimes committed by Osama bin Laden and Al 
Qaeda members since the Security Council has already determine the attacks on September 11 to 
be breaches of the Charter to the United Nations.170  It appears that the U.N. would not be willing 
to extend the ICTY’s jurisdiction.  There is a possibility of “tribunal fatigue” from hearing to 
many cases and be “reluctant to incur the political difficulties and expense of providing 
international prosecution in a situation where so many avenues for national prosecution are 
readily available.171  The ICTY has tired only 31 defendants in eight years at a cost of $400 
million dollars.172  It is also unlikely that the U.N. would extend jurisdiction for the acts of a 
single day, no matter how atrocious, and would not embrace a broader category of international 
terrorism to be prosecuted.173  Therefore, it would seem unlikely that the United Nations would 
extend jurisdiction to the ICTY to adjudicate the terrorist acts committed on September 11.
C. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the United Nations created the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.174  “The purpose [of the ICTR] was to contribute to 
the process of national reconciliation in Rwanda and to the maintenance of peace in the region, 
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 See U.N. Charter, supra note 156.  The United Nations Security Council on September 12, 2001 condemned the 
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replacing an existing culture of impunity with one of accountability.”175  As with the ICTY, the 
U.N. limited the ICTR’s jurisdiction geographically and by reference to when the crimes took 
place.176  The ad hoc tribunal has jurisdiction to adjudicate crimes that were committed between 
January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994.177  The ITCR was developed to prosecute the crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions that occurred in 1994 in the country of Rwanda.178  As with the extension of 
jurisdiction of the ICTY, the United Nations could extend the jurisdiction of the ICTR to 
prosecute the terrorist responsible for the attacks on the United States on the 11 of September.
As noted under the discussion on the ICTY, it would be unlikely that the U.N. would go through 
the trouble of complicating the ICTR jurisdictional responsibilities.  Consequently, the ICTR 
would not be a likely place to prosecute Osama bin Laden or other Al Qaeda members for the 
terrorist acts committed on 9/11.  
D. International Criminal Court
On July 1, 2002, the Rome Statute to the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) was 
entered into force.179  The ICC is a permanent tribunal located in Hague, the Netherlands, and 
“shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of 
international concern.”180 The Court has jurisdiction provided under the Rome Statute to 
prosecute the crime of genocide181, crimes against humanity182, war crimes183, and the crime of 
aggression.184  Any state that becomes party to the Rome Statute accepts the ICC’s jurisdiction 
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with respect to the crimes triable.185  As it stands today, the Rome Statute does not have an 
explicit provision against terrorism.  However, the attacks on 9/11 could fit into three of the four 
classes of crimes: crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.  The exact 
parameters will not be determined until all parties ratify the Rome Statute, which is open for 
ratification until June 30, 2004.
As of July 1, 2002, 139 countries have signed the Rome Statute, and 84 are actually parties.186
The ICC suffered a severe blow when the United States, who signed the Rome Statute on the last possible 
day, issued a statement that it did not intend to be bound by its signature.  On May 6, 2002, the United 
States informed the Security-General “that the United States does not intend to become a party to the 
treaty.  Accordingly, the United States has no legal obligations arising from its signature on December 31, 
2000.  The United States requests that its intention not to become a party, as expressed in this letter, be 
reflected in the depositary's status lists relating to this treaty."  In addition, the jurisdiction of the ICC is 
not retroactive, which means that the court could not hear any crimes committed before July 1, 2002, the 
day the Rome Statute entered into force.187
E. Advantages: International Tribunal
Prosecuting Osama bin Laden in an international forum has some advantages.  The final 
verdict may be more internationally accepted than if the suspected terrorists were tried under a 
secret military tribunal in the United States.  Islamic countries may be more likely to turnover 
suspected terrorists to an international ad hoc tribunal then to extradite to the United States.188
European countries that are party to the European Convention on Human Rights189 would be less 
hesitant to hand over custody to an international forum that does not rely on death as a possible 
sentence, as opposed to the United States in both domestic and the proposed military tribunals.  
185 See Rome Statute Art. 12, supra note 155.
186 See Rome Statute, supra note 155. For a list of signatories, and parties that have ratified available at 
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A “global court” would use internationally agreed upon standards of evidence for violations of 
national and international law.190  It is argued that an international tribunal would contain Islamic 
jurists and would give them an opportunity to demonstrate to the world that the Islamic faith 
does not condemn the acts of September 11.191  The prosecution in an international tribunal 
would alleviate some of the caseload for United States District Courts or U.S. military 
commissions.192  Finally, the United Nations has experience in creating ad hoc tribunals and has 
the wherewithal to instill proper and internationally accepted procedures and punishments.
  F.  Disadvantages: International Tribunals
There are disadvantages in prosecuting Osama bin Laden in an internationally created ad 
hoc tribunal.  The ad hoc international tribunals can seldom be classified as an efficient and 
expedient form of justice.  For example, in the ICTY, it took seven years just to indict Slobodan 
Milosevic.193  Even with all of the conventions, treaties, and law enacted, there is not agreed 
upon definition of what constitutes international terrorism.  A state may refuse to extradite or 
conceal an alleged offender from an international forum.194  “[Osama] bin Laden’s sympathizers 
would probably view [an international] tribunal as many Serbs view the United Nations-
sponsored, multi-ethnic international tribunal at The Hague: as a biased tool of western 
power.”195  Prosecuting in an international tribunal would not bring any credibility to the 
proceedings, especially to those to see bin Laden as a victim.  A trial before an international 
forum could act as a “springboard for bin Laden and his associates to portray themselves as 
martyrs.”196  University of Chicago Law professors Jack Goldsmith and Bernard Meltzer state:
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[s]uch a trial would ... enhance Mr. bin Laden's stature and appeal. He and other terrorists 
would use the event as a platform to attack the US's culture, motives and policies--an 
attack that would reverberate throughout the Muslim world. Any dissent from a guilty 
verdict would weaken the judgment's legitimacy and ... increase the terrorists' power and 
prestige. Acquittal on grounds of insufficient evidence would ... be possible, especially if 
protection of intelligence sources precluded the presentation of evidence. 
VII. CONCLUSION
 The United States District Courts, U.S. military commissions, and an international 
tribunal all potentially have valid personal and subject matter jurisdiction over Osama bin Laden 
and Al Qaeda terrorists for the acts perpetrated in the U.S. on the World Trade Center, the 
Pentagon, and Pennsylvania.  An analysis of the five general principles of international 
extraterritorial jurisdiction demonstrates that all proposed tribunals have jurisdiction based on 
one or more of the principles.  Specific jurisdiction in United States military tribunals and courts 
can be found in the United States Constitution or specifically designated within the statute.  For 
international tribunals, specific jurisdiction is conferred via statute and restricted to specific 
crimes committed in a specific territory.  Jurisdiction is valid, but is it proper?  Justice is a vague 
and ambiguous concept not easily defined.  The question of appropriateness in the sense of 
fulfilling justice as an end is charged with political and moral quandaries.  Most arguments are 
based on political objectives and notions of equity.  
Prosecuting Osama bin Laden and other suspected Al Qaeda terrorists in United States 
Federal courts, U.S. led military commission under President Bush’s Military Order, or in ad hoc 
international tribunals, existing or created all have numerous advantages.  However, all of the 
proposed forums have equally as many disadvantages.  Consequently, selecting one forum as an 
appropriate means to administer justice is nearly impossible.  Appropriateness ultimately 
depends on one’s political and or moral objectives.  In the United States, appropriate 
administration of justice for most would be nothing less than death for all those involved in the 
attacks.  The terrorists massacred over three thousand innocent lives on September 11; we, the 
people of the United States are obligated to take their lives.  However, such a narrow objective 
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blinds the United States to its very foundation.  The U.S. Constitution is based on notions of 
liberty, inalienable rights, and due process.  The United States political machine acting in blind 
rage would disregard these fundamental guarantees.  Other countries and entities in the 
international community would deem any forum without capital punishment as the only 
appropriate forums.  Most industrialized nations prohibit the death penalty.  The world consists 
of people of diverse cultures and beliefs governed by equally diverse governments.  An across 
the board consensus of what constitutes an appropriate forum to administer justice cannot 
possibly be found.  Condemnation of the horrific attacks on September 11 seems to be where the 
agreement between cultures and nations ends.
Extradition of suspected terrorists is a major obstacle blocking prosecution in the United 
States forums and in international tribunals.  The political offense exception could be used to 
block extradition.  The political offense is interpreted by different theories, all leading to the 
conclusion that extradition could be blocked for the attacks on September 11, contrary to any 
conventions or treaties stating otherwise.  Conventions and treaties have employed negative 
definitions which act to limit what will be covered by the political offense exception.  For 
example, the Convention on Hostage takings specifically orders parties to the convention to 
extradite or prosecute the suspects in its domestic system, thus limiting hostage taking from the 
political offense exception.  The next hurdle to extradition is capital punishment.  European 
countries have concluded that capital punishment violates the European Convention on Human 
rights, consequently extradition is inappropriate in cases were it is a possibility, thus extradition 
would be very difficult.
The appropriate and most effective means to administer justice to Osama bin Laden and 
suspected 9/11 terrorists is to prosecute them in countries where they are apprehended.  This 
solution would nullify the damaging affects of extradition.  A request and denial of extradition 
has an adverse impact on relations between the two States.  The tension could lead to splintering 
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of the international community, where a united front is enormously important.  Allowing States 
to try terrorists individually would also place terrorists on notice that any crime committed will 
be punished by whatever country apprehends them.  A global effort to eradicate terrorism 
country by country would be the most sufficient and efficient means of justice.  The world 
should ban together on a single front to combat the atrocities committed on September 11 and 
beyond.  This approach would not completely deny the United States from administering justice 
to bin Laden and suspected Al Qaeda members because any terrorist apprehended by the U.S. 
could be tried in Federal District courts.  However, the United States, more specifically President 
Bush, would not likely stand idly by while a foreign state prosecutes Osama bin Laden or other 
suspected terrorists in its domestic courts since the United States has a substantial interest in 
administering justice for the atrocities committed September 11, 2001.  
